This paper provides an analysis of oil pricing and supply through an examination of production allocations in conjunction with an investigation of unlagged and optimally lagged relationships between key weekly (reported daily) crude oil price series interacting with OPEC prices and price changes. With crude oil prices at record highs, high inflation in developing countries and the onset of systemic risk in global financial markets, the major global players should well remember the impact of oil supply interference of the late 1980s early 1990s on global financial stability.
Introduction
From March 1982 to September 2007 there were forty seven changes to OPEC member country crude oil production allocations. From early 1982 to early 2008 oil prices have moved from around US$10 per barrel to over US$100 per barrel. Are these movements in price, supply or demand driven? Is any lag in supply a problem attributable to lack of capacity or is it because of supply manipulation?
The first matter to be addressed in this paper is the notion of cartel versus cooperative activity and monopoly pricing. Antitrust behaviour is difficult to identify, and indeed prove, in courts of law. One of the problems relates to the inability to agree on a definition. Another issue is whether or not the law that applies in the developed world is appropriate for developing countries with legal, political, economic and cultural practices that are vastly different. The concern by some countries in the developing country group is that antitrust legislation does more to promote the interests of the developed countries.
There are of course many different arguments, opinions and philosophical bases associated with the international and domestic effects of cartel behaviour. This paper takes the view of those economists who believe in the assumptions and the positive outcomes of open market economies that encourage competition and allow market forces to freely interact to produce a fair clearing price for products.
That supply and demand forces should ultimately determine oil prices, is not an unreasonable proposition. We live in an age of rapid transfer of up to date information. This includes data on oil demand changes, however large they may be, from countries such as, China and India. Information should also be rapidly available on oil lifting, transport and other costs. Futures, swaps and options markets are available to assist in the management of excessive commodity price, interest rate and currency risks. Less obvious, however, is the degree to which supply in oil markets was manipulated from early 1982 to early 2008.
The OPEC group of net energy exporting developing nations is powerful. It is likely that OPEC members see no need to change the status quo in oil pricing mechanisms. From a legal standpoint, OPEC can't be or probably won't be attacked on an antitrust basis. The OPEC group has the major influence over global oil markets and is winning at present with substantial price gains over the period 1982 to 2008 on a net increase of only 10.25 million barrels per day in production allocations.
As of 11
th March 2008, global demand for oil stood at 87.5 million barrels per day (Oil Market Report, 2008) . Two thirds of global crude oil is consumed by OECD countries, primarily the US and Western Europe, but since the late 1990s China, Russia and India have greatly increased their consumption (Energy Information Administration, 2008) . For example, China oil demand in February, 1998 increased by 6.2% in February 2008 (Sydney Morning Herald, 2008 .
The giant Western oil companies may be quite content with such a surrogate cartel arrangement when a more direct agreement among them might be in contravention of antitrust legislation. The evidence supplied by most economists reviewed for the literature of this study supports the notion that OPEC members and some Non-OPEC members cooperate in setting production levels. Strong cooperation may be a euphemism for collusion. Collusion amounts to cartel behaviour. Cartel behaviour is monopoly pricing. Monopolistic markets are by definition inefficient and have far reaching implications for global financial stability.
Background
The OPEC members, over the period of this study, include Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. These members supply around 40% of the world's oil and have supplied 35% to 40% at least for the last decade. The Members of OPEC are developing countries. They are net energy exporters.
Non-OPEC countries supply around 60%. Most Non-OPEC countries are net oil importers. Most have private oil sectors. Their governments therefore have little control over production levels. Major exceptions to this situation are Mexico and Russia. In the case of Russia, although the oil companies have been private sector, the government has had control over the export pipeline network. Private sectors do not hold back profitable and efficient production. They maintain little excess capacity. Non-OPEC production is more vulnerable to price collapses. Non-OPEC oil producers thus tend to focus on geographical areas where lifting costs are less (Country Analysis Briefs, 2004) .
Several Non-OPEC countries share some of the characteristics of OPEC countries. At times they coordinate production policies with OPEC. Mexico has attended most OPEC meetings since 1997. Mexico has made several promises to OPEC to limit exports. Mexico has influenced major OPEC members, such as, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, in voting for OPEC production cuts. Russia too, has attended many of OPEC's meetings since 1997. During its current restructuring phase, Russia still has the potential to again be the leading world oil producer. There remains a lack of transparency in Russian reduction pledges. The question is whether the pledges are for production or export cuts.
According to Country Analysis Briefs (2004) it was ambiguous as to what the current Russian production levels were and for how long they would operate. Up to early 2008 this position is yet to be fully clarified. Norway has adjusted its production levels by agreement with OPEC on several occasions since 1998. The Norwegian oil industry until recently has been State owned 1 . Oman, a smaller Non-OPEC country, has attended most OPEC meetings. It has also made several commitments to reduce production in collaboration with OPEC. Angola is a new member but prior to 2004 attended OPEC meetings and agreed on one occasion (prior to 2004) to reduce production by agreement with OPEC (Country Analysis Briefs, 2004) .
Before mid 2004 speeches at OPEC meetings and conferences seemed to be characterised by rhetoric that economically rationalised decisions relating to production levels. Many of the meetings repeated a statistic that there was only enough proven oil reserves to last for the next 45 years. The Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources for Indonesia, Dr Purnomo Yusgiantoro, at the 131 st extraordinary meeting of the OPEC Conference in Beirut in June 2004, OPEC (2004) stated as follows: "Given the high and volatile prices and prevailing concern regarding supply security, and in order to ensure continued, robust, global economic growth, especially in the economies of fellow developing countries, the conference decided to increase the OPEC production ceiling (excluding Iraq) …… in order to ensure adequate supply and give a clear signal of OPEC's commitment to market stability and to maintaining prices at acceptable levels to both producers and consumers".
Ironically, in the opening address the same speaker at the same meeting had already said: "Oil prices, however, have continued to rise during this quarter to levels that have exceeded expectations. This is in spite of the market remaining well supplied with crude at all times and our Member countries producing above our organisation's agreed levels -something that we have not discouraged in the light of the present situation. The fact of the matter is that the high price of oil we have seen in recent weeks has not reflected upstream market fundamentals…….The high prices have been caused by a combination of factors over which OPEC has no controlspeculation on futures markets, tightness in the US gasoline market, geopolitical concerns and the higher than expected oil demand growth, especially in China and the USA". On one hand the lifting of production limits would have solved supply problems and on the other hand the high price of oil was due to external factors.
It is estimated that OPEC production will increase as a proportion of world production over ensuing years. This is because the smaller reserves of Non-OPEC countries are being depleted more rapidly. Their overall reserves to production ratio 2 is lower than that for OPEC countries (Country Analysis Briefs, 2004) . In short, OPEC is the most powerful force in global oil supply. By mid 2004 the price of crude oil was around USD 40 per barrel. At the time of writing, the price is over USD100 per barrel. Far from using its power to create an ordered market, OPEC may have been using supply allocations to manipulate prices steadily upward.
Waller (2000) questioned whether it was possible to sue the major oil companies and OPEC for unlawful conspiracy in causing record gasoline prices, large regional price disparities and shortages in various parts of the United States during year 2000. The last paragraph of Waller's conclusion states, "To paraphrase President Nixon, our Chief Executive at the time of the first energy crisis, you can do it but it would be wrong". The rationalisation behind such a glib statement, after some 59 pages of legal argument, was that due to the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Act of State Doctrine, foreign policy and diplomacy were deemed the appropriate means to deal with antitrust behaviour rather than lawsuits. It is apparent that legal practitioners as well as economists felt unable, perhaps due to a lack of transparency in the OPEC group, to speak frankly.
In the numerous investigations into the OPEC group, differentiation needs to be made between economic studies into market structure, and financial economics studies into market efficiency. The economic investigations have centred on testing whether or not OPEC engages in cartel behaviour or competitive behaviour. That is, testing hypotheses as to whether or not member States comprise a frictionless production syndicate that seeks to maximise its total profit. Output levels would be expected to move together on a pro rata basis in terms of reserves or production limits set. In the case of competitive behaviour, output levels of member States would also be expected to move together in response to demand shocks and cost fluctuations that impact the entire industry. Smith (2002) cited numerous economic studies that produced inconclusive and mixed evidence of cartel behaviour by OPEC (For example, Loderer, 1985; Griffin, 1985; Libecap, 1989; Jones, 1990; Dahl & Yucel, 1991; Gulen, 1996 3 ; Alhajji & Huettner, 2000; as well as behavioural studies such as, Geroski, Ulph & Ulph, 1987; and Griffin & Nielson, 1994) . However, these findings and those of other macroeconomic researchers generally, at least indicate strong "cooperative" behaviour among OPEC members.
In the absence of a substantial "market efficiency" based financial economics literature, the objectives of this paper are to investigate both unlagged and lagged key oil price series, their relationship to each other and the effect of production allocations on those prices. The examination is extended to structural break analysis in a model that includes the three key crude oil price indicators for OPEC, the Non-OPEC countries and for the US. The results of this analysis are expected to add to the body of knowledge that comments on oil market efficiency and cartel behaviour. There are implications of the effect of these anomalies on global financial stability at a time when there are significant spill overs in developed international banking markets and deepening global inflation, particularly in developing countries.
Data, Method and Models
Weekly crude oil price data on the major oil markets are examined for the period for the period 5 th July 1996 to 2nd February 2008. The data have been formatted on a five day week daily basis. In other words the source of data has provided weekly data reported daily. The price changes over this period have dramatic. Production allocation data are examined from 2nd February 1982 to 2nd February 2008 but analysed fully over a period from June 1996 to early February 2008 along with the above price data.
The price series investigated are 1). OPEC countries spot price for crude oil FOB (free on board) weighted by estimated export volume in US dollars per barrel: 2). Non-OPEC country spot price for crude oil FOB weighted by estimated export volume in US dollars per barrel: 3). United States spot price for crude oil FOB weighted by estimated import volume in US dollars per barrel. The data have been obtained from the United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (USDOE, 2008) and have been analysed using the Eviews6 (2008) statistical package. The price changes from July 1996 to February 2008 have been more dramatic that the changes from early 1982 to mid 1996. The unlagged model to be tested is as follows;
, represent the weekly (reported daily) Non-OPEC, OPEC and USA crude oil price at time t.
The analysis of unlagged data and its interaction in a single period regression provides an indication of how the data behave. Structural breaks tests and event window prices changes analysis are introduced for the unlagged data to describe the effect on OPEC price changes, of production allocation decisions. It would be expected that production allocation cuts would lead to increased prices in the shortterm. The opposite would be true of a lift in production allocations, however if production increases are insufficient to satisfy demand when excess capacity exists this will lead to a rise in prices. If required increases in allocations are delayed due to inadequate frequencies of ordinary, extraordinary or ministerial monitoring committee meetings this will also cause supply to lag demand and induce price increases. Chow 4 structural breaks tests are applied using the production allocation level announcement date. Changes in prices are also analysed and compared to changes in production allocation dates inserted in Chow structural breaks tests.
This unlagged model is later respecified into a vector autoregressive model (VAR) where the variables are optimally lagged. This enables the application of VAR based tests of cointegration and exogeneity to confirm long-term equilibrium relationships and short-term dynamics and exogeneity. It would be expected that the Non-OPEC market (with its powerful collaborating producers largely influencing a 60% global market share) would be exogenous and thus the major influence on OPEC prices and then US prices.
Findings

Interrelationship of crude oil markets: Preliminary analysis
Confirmation that the markets in unlagged prices are in fact highly interrelated is provided in Figure 1 and Table 1 . Table 1 shows evidence of interrelationship in a correlation matrix of the unlagged level series. The series more or less move together but for a small lag to be discussed later in the cointegration and causality section of the findings. The OLS regressions of unlagged data are initially used to similarly demonstrate the strong relationships between each market in prices and price changes.
The results of the level series ordinary least squares regressions are spurious due to the existence of serial correlation in the regression errors as revealed by Durbin Watson tests (Durbin & Watson, 1971) . There is also significant heteroskedasticity in the error term as indicated by White tests (EViews6, 2008) . According to augmented Dickey Fuller unit root tests (Dickey & Fuller, 1981) ; the level series in prices are nonstationary as are the errors of the regression of OPEC against Non-OPEC and US price series. The model is respecified into a weighted two stage least squares to take account of the heteroskedasticity problems. These results are summarised in Tables  2 and 3 . 
Production allocation changes
Structural break tests
The Chow forecast test estimates two models (in this study, derived from Equation 2), with one date inserted (the production allocation date) to compare the relationship over two periods. One model uses the full set of data and the other using a long subperiod model from the date of the announcement to the end of the full sample period. A long distance between the two models can cast doubt on the stability of the estimated relationship over the sample period. This is indicated in the significance and magnitude of the Log Likelihood Ratio.
The Chow breakpoint test is a measure of parameter consistency and fits an equation separately for each sub-sample. Two or more dates can be inserted. The test highlights whether there are significant differences in the equation parameters between sub-samples. In this study two dates can be inserted. The first date is the first announcement date of OPEC production allocation and the second is the next announcement date. Three equations can then be compared. That is, the equation from the start to the first announcement date, that from the first announcement to the second announcement, that from the second announcement to the end of the sample period and finally the results over the full sample period.
Findings on structural breaks tests
An insignificant (high) probability in these tests means that there is no rejection of the null hypothesis of no structural change in the relationship. That is there is/are no structural break/s. A significant (low probability) means that there is a rejection of the null hypothesis of no structural change in the relation. That is, there is a/are structural break/s. Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the Chow forecast and breakpoint tests respectively for the first differenced (price change) model in Equation 2.
The significance and magnitude of the F test statistics indicates the strength of the change in the equation parameters in the sub-sample periods. An increase in the F statistic implies an increase in price movements in that model for the specified subsample compared other sub-samples and those over the full sample period. In the forecast test, the sub-sample period being compared is that from the date of the announcement of the production allocation to the end of the full sample period. This period reduces in comparison to the full period as indicated by a reducing magnitude of the Log Likelihood Ratio indicating a weakening reliability of the information.
Under the forecast test, where both test statistics are not significant it is deemed there is no structural break. Where one of the test statistics is not significant it is assumed no structural break. Where both test statistics are significant it is deemed a structural break. Table 5 shows that since 5 th June 1996, according the Chow forecast tests, there have been 13 structural breaks in the equation from meeting 22 to meeting 47 and the breaks cover a period of substantial oil price rises from early 2003 to early 2008 (that is, a period of a trebling of the price from around USD29 to USD93 per barrel).
It is not possible to discern from this forecast test data, whether increases (decreases) in production allocations, are directly associated with decreases (increases) in oil price movements. Only on 6 occasions of structural breaks out of a total of 13 did production allocation increases (decreases) lead to decreases (increases) in price movements. As most oil prices increased over the full period of the study it is deemed that either increases or decreases in production allocations within the sub-sample period have induced oil prices to rise overall in that subsample period, higher than the rises over the full sample period. Note: * denotes not significant (F statistics and log likelihood ratios are not reported in these instances); ** significant at 1% level; *** significant at 5%; **** significant at 10%. Table 6 gives the results of the Chow breakpoint test with the results reported for each period between consecutive announcements of changes in production allocations. This period is compared to the period from the beginning of the full sample period up to the first announcement, the period after the second announcement until the end of the full sample period and also the full sample period of the study. On those occasions, if the F statistic and the Log Likelihood Ratios are both significant, it is deemed that there has been a structural break in the equation during the period between consecutive announcement dates.
Higher F statistics (that is, an increase in the F statistic from one meeting to the next) indicate a greater explanatory power of the regression equation (that is, it indicates higher price movements from one meeting to the next). The size of the sample period between consecutive announcement dates depends only on the time between meetings. If there is a longer period between these meetings, (that is, those which induced a structural break), a significant and higher Log Likelihood Ratio results.
There were 20 meetings out of 25 that induced structural breaks. Out of the total number of structural breaks there were only 10 meetings where an increase (decrease) in the production allocation led to a reduction (increase) in the price movements (that is, in accordance with economic theory). It is again difficult to say whether or not an increase (decrease) in production allocations leads to a reduction (increase) in price movements. But, once again it is evident that production allocation changes do induce significant price movements in the sub-sample and the movements have been upwards. 
Tests of Cointegration and Causality
Some explanatory power of the unlagged model is lost after first differencing, but serial correlation problems are removed according to the Durbin Watson test statistic and the ordinary least squares regression is respecified to a weighted two stage least squares model because of persistent heteroskedasticity.
First differencing also converts the series and the errors of the associated regression to stationarity and reveals integrated non-stationary processes as demonstrated by the application of augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests (See Appendices 1 and 2). A VAR is specified to enable testing for cointegration (Johansen, 1988) and causality (Granger, 1988) of optimally lagged data. Whilst a VAR stability condition check reveals that the VAR is not stable (that is, at least one unit root lies outside the unit circle), the VAR testing revealed the existence of at least two cointegrating equations (according to Trace and Maximum Eigen value tests. See Appendices 3 and 4) on an optimal lag of 6 days 5 (according to the Final Prediction Error, the Akaike Information Criteria Schwartz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria. See Appendices 3 and 4). The evidence supports an interrelationship between the series which, experience similar stochastic trends and achieve equilibrium together in the long-term over the period of the study.
Granger causality tests (Granger, 1988) reveal that, on an optimal lag of 6 (where the F statistics are highest with significance levels at 1%); it is evident that the Non-OPEC market is the major exogenous force on the OPEC market and then the US market. Tables 7 and 8 summarises the results in both VAR based (Table 7) and Pairwise causality tests (Table 8 ). The tests confirm that that Non-OPEC Granger causes the US market and that Non-OPEC Granger causes OPEC. Oddly it is evident that the US Granger causes OPEC, but comment will be made on this information in the discussion section. 
Discussion
The main question is whether or not the major Non-OPEC oil producing countries, such as Russia, Norway and Mexico, informally cooperate with OPEC production allocation decisions. Country Analysis Briefs (2004), for example, say they attend meetings and they imply an involvement in the collusion on production levels. This may explain why Non-OPEC prices drive OPEC and US prices on a six day lag 6 according to the data in this study. The adjusted optimal lag (see footnote) is one to two days. It is also oddly evident that US price changes drive OPEC changes. Is the US market gaining prior information about production allocation levels from the major Non-OPEC countries and is it therefore early to adjust prices?
Another question is whether or not production allocations are reduced because of a lack of productive capacity in times of political riskiness or excessive demand. Anecdotally, Saudi Arabia seems to have the ability to substantially increase its capacity at short notice. The world demand for oil has increased dramatically over the past decade or so from strongly developing countries and strongly emerging economies such as India and China respectively. However, it is an informationally efficient age. Demand and supply information flows very quickly. If this has caused supply to lag demand, what have OPEC countries been doing to increase capacity to satisfy that demand? Why have OPEC production allocations shown a net increase of only some 10.25 million barrels per day over the past 25 years? Surely production infrastructure could have been funded out of the huge profits reaped over that period as the price of oil has risen tenfold from early 1982 to early 2008. Another question is whether or not there a lag between the decision to lift production allocations and the time the related increases in production come into effect.
Why are the multinational oil companies and Western governments so seemingly passive about the high price of crude oil? The answer of course must be that they prefer higher oil prices. High prices mean higher profits for the oil companies and higher taxation receipts for Western governments, despite the effect of any 6 A weakness of this study is in the limitations of the data which report weekly data on a daily basis. The real lag is one to two days if daily price changes could be taken into account. These were not available.
depreciation of the US dollar as the main invoicing currency. Foreign exchange risk can be hedged. Do the major Western oil companies have a surrogate cartel in OPEC? A future research direction will address the question of what happens to oil company share prices before and after the announcement date of the change in the production allocation. An event study may or may not prove that there is an insider trading benefit.
Conclusion
Regression analysis, cointegration and causality tests provide evidence that the key oil markets are strongly related and that they are highly interdependent. More importantly, it is demonstrated that exogeneity lies with the Non-OPEC market. That is, the Non-OPEC price change is the major influence on the OPEC and the US price changes. The US oil price changes are a major influence on OPEC price changes. The question remains as to what early information is held by major Non-OPEC oil producing countries and then by the US market on OPEC production allocations.
Changes in production allocations through OPEC conference meetings appear to induce structural breaks in the OPEC price change series. It is not clear whether or not increases (decreases) in production allocations lead to decreases (increases) in price movements as the evidence is mixed. However, this would be logical in an economic sense, as production allocation reductions would, under normal conditions, reduce supply and induce and upward movement in prices. Nevertheless, it appears that overall production allocation decisions up or down, has induced structural breaks that show an increase in price movements.
No doubt political risk factors and increased demand factors flow on to affect production risk and/or the adjustment of capacity. Political factors have probably played a part in oil price rises over the period of the study with continuing conflict in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Israel and Lebanon. However, it is unlikely that all price rises or even a significant portion of them is due to political uncertainty. Capacity may be a problem, but it is difficult to get reliable information on this as well as on lags between positive production allocations and actual increases in production.
By early 2008, at the time of writing, most global economies (but particularly strongly developing economies) are experiencing increased inflationary pressures. Oil remains a vital global commodity and large price increases lead to inflationary pressure and hikes in official interest rates, despite the fact that the US appears to currently have inflation under control and is endeavouring to stimulate its domestic economy with interest rate cuts.
The world has already experienced the result of oil production level cooperation in the energy crisis of the late 1970s. The energy crisis led to the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and double digit inflation. Currently systemic risks exist in Western banking and a new third world debt crisis is looming. Inflationary pressures are present due to high oil prices. Many media commentators have suggested that lower oil prices would provide a greater level of global economic stimulus than foreign aid to poorer nations or the writing off of their IMF or World Bank debt. 
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